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Averch and Johnson have provided analytical support for the
assertion that rate of return regulation causes inefficient production because of the overuse of capital. Empirical evidence in
support or refutation of their thesis is just beginning to appear.
This paper provides additional evidence. The regulated firm's
objective is stated in terms of cost minimization subject to a
regulatory constraint. The effect of changes in the allowed rate
of return on capital are evaluated. It is shown that as the
allowed return approaches the cost of capital, costs increase
and the percentage of total costs paid to capital also increases.
These are testable implications of the revised A-J model. Data
on costs, input prices, and output are collected for electric
power production. Three measures of regulatory policy with
regard to the allowed return are formulated. Econometric
analysis suggests that lower allowed rates of return are
significantly associated with higher costs and larger proportions
of cost going to capital. These findings are consistent with the
revised A-J model and with those of other recent investigators .

• Price regulation of electric power in the United States is
accomplished by using a rate of return on capital criterion. The
individual firm is allowed to charge prices which will allow it to
recover its expenses while also earning a fair rate of return on its
capital base.
Price changes to be allowed by a commission are determined
in a rate case. The rate case is a quasi-judicial proceeding which
determines the firm's present revenues, expenses, capital or rate
base, and rate of return in relation to a test period (usually the
latest twelve-month period for which data are available). The
rate case also determines the appropriate or fair rate of return. If
the rate of return earned by the firm in the test period is less
than the fair rate of return, then the firm will be allowed to raise
prices. If the return is greater than the fair return, a reduction
in prices may be ordered. The new prices which the commission
will allow are set such that they generate sufficient revenues to
allow the firm to pay its expenses plus earn the fair rate of return
on its rate base. Thus, regulation can be considered as a cost
plus profit process.
H. Craig Petersen received the B.S. in economics and computer science
from Utah State University in 1968 and the Ph.D. in economics from Stanford
University in 1973. Currently he is studying the impact of particular regulatory
policies on the operations of utilities and the economic. institutional. and legal
aspects of solar energy.
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There are significant differences among the states regarding
the particulars of their regulatory procedures. Some states have
large, active regulatory commissions, while others have small,
poorly staffed commissions which have rarely required rate
adjustments. 1 In some states the regulation of electric power
rates is done on a local rather than a statewide basis. At the
present time Texas, South Dakota, and Minnesota do not have
statewide commissions. Until 1966, Iowa also regulated electric
power on a local basis. The record of local commission regulation is rather poor; its demise attests to that fact. It is a maintained hypothesis of this paper that local regulation is less effective than that done on a statewide basis. 2
For many years students of regulation have argued that the
cost-plus type of regulation used in the United States does not
provide utilities with much incentive to be efficient in their
provision of service. In their 1962 article, Averch and Johnson
(A-J)3 give analytical support for the proposition that such regulation tends to result in inefficient production. Starting with the
assumptions of no regulatory lag, profit maximization, and an
allowed rate of return greater than the cost of capital, they
demonstrate that the firm has an incentive to use more capital in
production than would be dictated by strict cost minimization. A
substantial literature has accumulated which extends and refines
the basic A-J idea. 4
Intuitively, what occurs is that the firm is constrained as to
the amount of total profits it may earn, and seeks means of
circumventing the regulatory constraint. This is accomplished
by overutilizing capital. Since the firm is assumed to be allowed
to earn more on each additional unit of capital employed than
the cost of that capital to the firm, up to some point profits are
increased by substitution of capital for the other input, labor.
Another way of looking at the result is to view the excess
return, s-PK , where s is the allowed return and P K is the cost of
capital, as a subsidy granted to the use of capital. The firm in its
decision making maximizes profits by using each input until its
value in production equals its cost, but because each unit of
capital is subsidized, the firm does not use the market cost of
capital in the decision process, but some shadow price of capital
less than P K • Capital is used until the value of its marginal
product is driven down to this shadow price. In this view, the
firm behaves in the same manner as any profit-maximizing firm,
but uses a different capital price.
In spite of the potential importance of the Averch and Johnson result, empirical support or refutation has been slow in
coming. First to be published were articles by Spann and by
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1 See Clark, Dodge. and Co. [5] or Federal Power Commission [9] for
infOImation on commission composition and policies.
2 See Reschenthaler [16] for one of the few published discussions on the
nature of municipal regulation. The ineffectiveness of local regulation is considered in most texts on the economics of regulation. See Phillips [IS], for
example.
3 In [I].
4 The most comprehensive of the A-J publications are those by Bailey [2]
and by Baumol and Klevorick [4).

Courville. 5 Both confirm the existence of A-J type inefficiency.
The objective of this paper is to add to the emerging body of
empirical evidence on the effect of rate of return regulation.
• In this section the A verch-J ohnson analysis is reformulated in
terms of cost minimization subject to technology and regulatory constraints. The effect of changes in the allowed return on
capital on costs and input choice is investigated. It is shown
that costs increase for the production of any given level of
output as the allowed return approaches the cost of capital. It is
also demonstrated that the use of capital and the proportion of
total costs paid to capital increase as regulation becomes more
stringent.
For the unconstrained firm, a necessary condition for
profit-maximization is that the cost of producing the chosen
level of output be minimized subject to the constraint imposed
by existing technology. A similar requirement holds for the
regulated profit-maximizing firm, but with the additional
qualification that, in minimizing costs, the profit limitation must
not be violated. That is, the firm must choose inputs such that
the difference between production costs and revenues generated
from the chosen output does not exceed the allowed rate of
return per unit of capital employed. The regulated firm attempts
to circumvent the regulatory constraint by incorporating into its
costs a higher expenditure on capital than would be used on a
strict cost minimization criterion.
Formally stated, the problem of the firm is to minimize
C = PLL

+ PKK + PFF

2. Theoretical model

(1)

subject to the production technology constraint,

Q,

(2)

R-PLL-PFF ~ sK

(3)

Q(K, F, L) ~

and the regulatory constraint,

where L, K, and F are labor, capital, and fuel inputs, the Pi are
input prices, Q is the chosen level of output, s is the allowed
return on capital, and R is total revenue, PQ.
The production function, Q(K,F,L) is taken to be quasiconcave with QL ~ 0, QK ~ 0, and QF ~ 0. It is assumed that
each input is required for production: Q(O, F, L) = Q(K, 0,
L) = Q(K, F, 0) = 0. Also, the A-J assumption of s-PK > is
adopted. The author has considered the strength of this assumption in an earlier paper. 6 Both the regulatory constraint and the
production function constraint are assumed binding for the remainder of the discussion. Thus, the relationships (2) and (3)
hold as equalities.
The problem is solved by using the Lagrangian multiplier
method. The Lagrangian is

°

:£

-PLL - PFF - PKK + v[-Q +Q(K, F, L)]
+ iI.(sK + PLL + PFF - R),

=

5
6

In [17) and [6), respectively.
See [13).

(4)
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where v and A are Lagrangian multipliers, and are interpreted as
the change in the optimum value of the objective function for a
change in the constant of the associated constraint.
The first-order conditions are:

+ APL +

VQL = 0

(5)

+ APF + VQF = 0
-PK + As + VQK = 0

(6)

- PL
-PL

R-

(7)

PFF - PLL - s K = 0

Q-

Q(K, F, L)

(8)

=0

K > 0, L > 0, F > 0, V> 0, A >

(9)

o.

(10)

Consider equation (5), which can be written as
1 - A = vQdP L •

(11)

Since v, QL, and P L are all nonnegative, then 1 - A ;:3 0 and
A ~ 1. If A = 1, that implies [by equation (7)] that
P K - S = VQK ;:3 O. But this in turn requires P K ;:3 s, which contradicts the assumption that s > P K • Thus, 0 < A < 1.
Since s > P K , then As > APK and -As < - APK. Adding P K
to each side, P K - As < P K - APK. Dividing by 1 - A gives:
(P K

-

As)/(1 - A)

< PK •

(12)

Equations (5), (6), and (7) imply the following relationships:
QFIQK = PFI(PK - As)/(1 - A)

QdQK

=

PL/(PK

PLIPl'

-

As)/(1 - A)

= QLIQl'.

(13)
(14)
(15)

The term (PK - As)/(1 - A) can be interpreted as the implicit
or shadow price of capital used by the constrained firm in its
decision process. In that this price is less than the market price,
P K , capital is used more intensively in production of Q than
would be the case if the firm were allowed unconstrained cost
minimization. Intuitively, what occurs is that the firm must
increase its allowable profits (sK) if the regulatory constraint is
not to be violated. By substituting capital for other inputs, total
allowable profits are increased because the base to which s is
applied is expanded. Thus, while costs, PKK + PLL + Pl'F, do
increase, the constraint is in a sense relaxed, and the opportunity set of the firm in terms of total allowable profits is expanded.
Equations (8), (13), (14), and (15) form a system of four
equations in four unknowns, K*, L *, F*, A*, where the asterisks
denote the optimum values of the variables. These equations can
be solved, at least conceptually, in terms of the parameters of
the system; Q, P K, P L , P l" and s. The optimum input bundle for
the constrained firm is given by:
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K* = K(Q, P L , P F , P K, s)

(16)

L* = L(Q, P L , P l' , P K, s)

(17)

F* = F(Q, P L , P l' , P K, s).

(18)

Since C*
imply

=

P LL * + PFF* + PKK*, equations (16), (17), and (18)
(19)

Equation (19) is the general relationship from which the statistical models of Section 3 are derived.
The effect of changes in s on the cost which the firm incurs
to produce the output Q can be determined by differentiating the
Lagrangian expression (4) with respect to s:

a::£/as

=

(20)

AK.

The first-order conditions for an optimum guarantee that the
value of the Lagrangian, ::£, at K*, L *, F* , and A* is always equal
to the value of the objective function, -C, for all s. Thus

a::£/as = a( -C)/as = AK

(21)

and

aCias

=

-AK.

(22)

Since A > 0 and K > 0, it follows that aCias < o.
The result is a testable hypothesis of the Averch-Johnson
model. If quantity and input prices are held constant, then the
cost of production increases as regulation becomes tighter, that
is, as s approaches P K •
It is possible that the inverse relationship between costs and
the allowed rate of return may exist for reasons other than that
proposed by Averch and Johnson. For instance, it has been
asserted that regulation reduces the incentive to be efficient. It is
possible that costs may increase in tightly regulated jurisdictions
because of an input neutral shift of the cost function as management becomes more lax. Additional implications of the
model are derived to differentiate neutral upward shifts of the
cost function stemming from managerial indifference from cost
increases resulting from profit-maximizing management's attempts to circumvent the regulatory constraint.
Consider first the model's implications regarding d(PKK/C)/ds,
or the change in the percent of total cost going to capital for a
change in the allowed rate of return, with output held constant.
Note that

d(PKK/C)/ds

=

PKK (
C

dK/ds _
K

dC/ds )
C'

(23)

which indicates that the percent spent on capital increases if the
percentage change in capital used in production is greater than
the percentage change in total cost.
Since C = PKK + PLL + PFF, then

dC/ds

=

PLdLids + PFdF/ds + PKdK/ds.

(24)

Substituting (24) into (25) gives
=

~K [(dK/ds) ( C -ilK
(25)
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Since C - PKK > 0, if it can be shown that dKlds < 0 and
PLdLids + PFdFlds > 0,
then
it
is
also
true
that
d(PKKIC)ds < O. These relationships are investigated using
comparative statics procedures.
Differentiating the first-order conditions of the model completely with respect to K, F, L, s, A, and v generates the
following system of equations:

[

;;

o
o

~ ~:: ~:~:] [:;;~]
0
0

PL
QL

S
QK

PF
QF

=

dKlds
dF Ids

[1,]

(26)

-K
0

Solving by Cramer's rule gives

dKlds

=

KQd(QKIs - QLIPL)PLS.

(27)

But QKIs - QdPL is negative by (14), hence dKlds < O. As regulation tightens, the firm uses more and more capital to produce
the output Q.
The expressions for dLlds and dFlds can be derived in a
similar manner. Their signs, however, cannot be specified without additional assumptions. Fortunately, equation (25) requires
only that the sign of PLdLids + PFdFlds be determined. A tedious number of algebraic operations results in

PKdLlds + PFdFlds

=

-KQKIs(QKIs - QLIPL),

(28)

which is positive by (14). Thus PLdLids + PFdFlds > 0 and
dKlds < O. Hence, by equation (25), it is known that
d(PKKIC)lds is negative.
By way of review, it is asserted that if the A-J analysis is a
meaningful description of the behavior of the constrained firm,
then the following relationships hold for production of the level
of output Q:

dClds < 0

(29)

and

d(PKKIC)lds <

3. Statistical model
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o.

(30)

• Previous empirical researchers have investigated the electric
power industry. 7 These studies, taken together, provide a
framework for the choice of a functional form for this analysis.
The basic properties which will be required of the chosen form
are that it allow for increasing (and changing) returns to scale,
that it be amenable to estimation using three factors (capital,
labor, and fuel), that it be augmentable by a technological
change parameter, and that it not impose a priori restrictions 'on
elasticities of substitution between factors. Also, as a statistical
convenience, it should be estimable by standard linear methods.
The three common functional forms used in the estimation of
cost and production functions are the linear form, the Cobb7 See the studies by Barzel [3], Dhrymes andnKurz [7], and Nerlove [12].
Other studies are listed in Petersen [14].

Douglas form, and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
form. Each of these is deficient with respect to at least one of
the above criteria.
In this analysis, rather than begin with a definite functional
form, we consider the general cost function
InC

+ C(lnX 1 , lnX2 ,

aT

=

••• ,

lnXn ),

(31)

where the X; are the arguments of the cost function (the input
prices, output levels, and regulatory variables), and aT allows
for input neutral technological change. That is, it is allowed that
the log of cost of producing a given output may shift by some
factor aT over time.
The exact functional form of equation (31) is not known, but,
following the procedure adopted by Jorgenson, Christensen, and
Lau,s we assume that the true functional form can be approximated sufficiently accurately for the purpose at hand by a
second-order Taylor series approximation of (31) about
lnX = [0], where X is a column vector of the X;, and [0] is an
n-element column vector of zeros:
InC = aT + C(lnX = [0)) +

f ~I
aInX;
i=l

1nX=[0]

.

lnX;

(32)

I
a 2C
. InX;lnXh
aInS;alnXj 1nX=[0]

n n
+ -1L
L
2;=lj=1

where 11nX = [0] indicates that the derivatives are to be evaluated
at InX; = 0 for all i and j.
Denote the constant terms as
C(lnX

=

= a' 0

[0))

ac I
alnX; 1nX =
2

a c

a InXia InXj

=

[0]

(33)
'

a i

I

for all ;
=

y'ij

(34)

for all i andj.

(35)

1nX = [0]

Hence, the cost function can be written as
n

InC

= a'o

1

n

n

+ aT + La'iInX; + - L LY'ijlnX;lnXj .
;=1
2 ;=1 j=l

(36)

In that the expansion is about zero, the accuracy of the
approximation depends on how closely each lnX; approaches
zero. The approximation error can be minimized by setting the
mean of each Xi to unity. This is done using the normalization,
for each i,

(37)

where X ik is the kth observation of the ith variable, and m is the
number of observations. For the logs of X'i to be well defined, it
is necessary that each X;k be positive.
The functional form of (36) has 2 + (n12)(n + 3) coefficients
to be estimated. It imposes few a priori restrictions on the
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parameters. Returns to scale cannot only be increasing, but can
vary for different levels of output. The elasticity of substitution
varies between inputs and for different levels of input usage.
Technological change has been incorporated, and the model is
easily estimable by simple linear methods. Thus, all of the requirements of functional form indicated by previous studies are
satisfied. 9
In terms of the variables of Section 2, equation (36) becomes

InC'

=

ao + aT + Q{JInQ' + aLInP'L + aFInP'F + aKInP'K

+ aRIn«s - P K)') + 'YQQ(lnQ'F + 'YLL(lnP'L)2
+ 'YKK(InP'K)2 + 'YFF(lnP'F)2 + 'YRR[ln«s - PK)')F
+ 'YQLInQ'lnP'L + 'YQFlnQ'lnP'F + 'YQKInQ'lnP'K
+ 'YQRInQ'In«s - PK)') + 'YLKInP'LInP'K
+ 'YLF InP'L InP'F + 'YLR InP'L In«s - PK)')
+ 'YKF InP'K InP'F + 'YKR InP'K In«s - PK)')
+ 'YFRlnP'Fln«s - P K)'),

(38)

where the primes denote the normalized variables as given by
equation (37), T is an index of technology, the Pi are input
prices, Q is quantity, and s - P K is the difference between the
allowed rate of return and the cost of capital, or "regulatory
tightness." Equation (38) is the basic equation for determining
the effect of regulation on unit costs.
N ext we consider the percentage of total expenditure going
to capital. The estimating equation chosen is
PKKIC = bo

+ bQInQ' + bQQ (lnQ')2 + bKInP'K
+ bFlnP'F + bLInP'L + bRln«s - PK)').

(39)

The theoretical model of Section 2 predicts that bR should be
negative if an A-J effect is operative.
The statistical analysis is carried out using ordinary least
squares (OLS). Behind the OLS methodology is the assumption
that all variables on the right-hand side of equations (38) and (39)
are either exogenous or predetermined. The presence of endogenous variables generates estimates of the coefficients which
are biased. The Pi are exogenous as is s if the political influence
of the firm on the commission is taken to be negligible. The
quantity terms require some discussion. If there is no A-J effect,
that is if the firm does not manipulate costs in the attempt to
circumvent the regulatory constraint, then technology dictates
costs and the price set by the commission is determined by
technology and the allowed rate of return. Quantity as a function
of price is, thus, exogenous to the firm. On the other hand, if
tighter regulation results in higher costs, then the firm may be
able to manipulate price and, hence, quantity. Note that as s
decreases, costs increase. It is assumed that, if an A-J effect is
operative, the two are offsetting, and the price fixed by the
commission remains unchanged in equilibrium. Thus, quantity is
exogenous to the firm. Such a result is a possible explanation for
Stigler-Friedland's finding 10 that regulation had no effect on
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9 The properties of functional forms such as (38) are discussed in Jorgenson,
Christensen, and Lau [II].
10 In [18].

prices. In a related study!! the author has relaxed the assumption of quantity being exogenous and, using a simultaneous
equation model and a different data set, tested for the A-J effect.
The results are consistent with those of this analysis.
• The sample consists of fifty-six steam generating plants
which experienced at least a fifty-percent expansion during the
period 1960 to 1965. These are observed over the three-year
period, 1966 to 1968. The selection of plants which significantly
expanded capacity is dictated by the theoretical model which is
derived in marginal terms. The analysis suggests that regulation
causes planners to choose excessively capital-intensive production. Only in plants where capacity is being added is there much
possibility for capital-other input substitution. Ex post substitution in the industry is probably very limited.
The dependent variable used in estimation of (38) is the log
of cost of production per unit of output in terms of dollars per
thousand KWH. The dependent variable associated with (39) is
the percent of total cost going to capital.
Output is in terms of millions of KWH of power. Fuel price
is given as cost per million British Thermal Units of energy. The
wage rate is expressed as dollars per year per employee. The
capital price is formulated in terms of the annual rental price of
capital as suggested by Jorgenson.!2 That is,
PK

=

q(r

+ 8 - q),

4. Data

(40)

where q is the price of equipment, r is the interest rate, 8 is the
rate of depreciation, and q the rate of price change for equipment. An index of technology is constructed by determining the
computed average time that capital had been in service. A
dummy variable is included to distinguish plants which are
owned by firms which are part of interstate holding companies.
Participation in holding companies may be considered to be an
additional scale variable.
Tightness of regulation proved difficult to quantify. Three
measures are used in the analysis. First, as has been noted, four
states during the study period did not have statewide regulatory
commissions. Regulation is assumed to be less effective in these
states. Thus, the model suggests that cost per unit of output
should be lower in plants which operate in these states. Actual
data consist of a dummy variable which takes on a value of one
in states with commissions and zero in the states without commissions.
Second, state commissions can be characterized as determining the rate base on an original cost basis or on a fair value
basis. The former method uses the value of the firm's capital as
it appears on the firm's books, while the latter gives recognition
to increased capital costs over time and may be five to fifty
percent higher than original cost. Eiteman and Stuart!3 found
that when the rate base was adjusted so as to be comparable in
II
12
I"

In [14].
In [IOJ.
In [8] and [19], respectively.
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these two types of jurisdictions, a higher rate of return was, on
average, allowed in fair value states. The differential was statistically significant. Thus, a second measure of "regulatory tightness" adopted is division of plants which operate in fair value
states from those which operate in original cost jurisdictions. It
is assumed that fair value regulation is more liberal in terms of
allowed profits. The theoretical model predicts that average cost
and percentage of cost going to capital should be lower in plants
operating in these states. Data assume the form of a dummy
variable taking on a value of one in states with original cost
commissions and zero for states with fair value commissions or
no state commission.
A third method of measuring regulatory stringency examines
the return to equity capital. Because of the residual nature of the
return to common stockholders, it is here that liberal or conservative commission policies are most dramatic. In a rate case an
overall return on the capital base is allowed. Out of this total the
firm must meet its debt, preferred stock, and common stock
obligation; and its legal priorities are in that order. Fixed debt
and preferred stock interest and dividends must be paid before
common stockholders can receive dividends. Because of this
legal priority, a one-percent change in the overall rate of return
has a multiplied effect on the return to equity. If the firm has
fifty-percent common stock in its capitalization, a one-percent
change in the allowed rate of return has a two-percent effect on
the return to equity. Thus, it is on the common stockholder that
"tightness of regulation" is really felt.
The relationship between s - P K , the average allowed return
minus the average cost of capital, and Se - Pe. the average
return to equity minus the cost of equity, is just
S - P K = (se - P e)(l - /3), where /3 is the percent of debt capital
in the rate base. An index of Se - Pecan be derived based on
the assumption that capital markets are efficient in their evaluation of a firm's relative profitability.
The value of a utility's stock at time 0 is given by the
discounted value of the expected dividend stream,
(41)
+ Pe)l,
1=1
where MVo is the price of the firm's common stock at time 0, D t
is the dividend at time t and is given by the relationship
D t = DoO + g)f, where g is a constant rate of dividend growth.14
If the rate of dividend growth is less than the cost of capital,
then (41) becomes
(42)
MVo = D 1 /(P e - g),

MVo

= IDt/(l

which can be solved for Pe:
P _

e-

D1

MVo

+g.

(43)

To return to equation (42), the dividend paid at time t is just the
dividend pay-out ratio, d, times earnings per share for the
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14 This model of stock price valuation is found in most introductory finance
texts such as Van Horne [20).

period, EPS t • Earnings per share for the regulated firm are
constrained to be less than or equal to the allowed return on
equity capital, Se' times the total of equity capital, Xt, divided by
the number of common shares outstanding, n. Hence
MVo = d(seXo1n)/(Pe - g).

(44)

But Xoln is just book value of common equity per share, BVo.
Substituting and solving for Se gives
Se

=

MVo(P e - g)ldBVo·

(45)

Substituting in the expression for P e of equation (43) gives
Se

= MVo(D!IMVo)ldBVo = D!ldMVo.

(46)

Thus, the difference between Se and P e is given by
(47)
Equation (47) suggests that a continuous variable measuring
regulatory stringency can be derived by using the firm's dividend, dividend pay-out ratio, book value of equity, stock
price, and expected growth rate in dividends. It was previously
noted that Se - P e should be adjusted for capitalization differences. The notation S S is u sed to denote S e - P e adjnsted for
capitalization. The data used in determining SS are those for the
firm owning the plant under observation. Firms which are part
of interstate holding companies had to be eliminated when using
this measure because the financial data necessary were not always available on a firm basis. Nine plants were excluded from
the original sample for this reason.
In the actual use of the data, the continuous variables were
normalized to meet the specifications of Section 3. An exception
is that of SS with several negative values for which the log is not
defined. SS is used in linear form with mean equal to zero. The
data are further discussed by Petersen in an earlier work.!5

• The notation used in this section and the criteria for
statistical significance of the coefficients are given in the Appendix. The numbers in parentheses beneath the coefficients are the
associated t-values.
The unit cost regressions using REG and FAIR are carried
out using a modified Cobb-Douglas functional form. Only the
continuous variable, SS, is used to estimate the generalized cost
function of Section 3. 16
REG is significant at 0.01, but the FAIR variable is not
significant. However, both coefficients are positive as predicted
by the theoretical model. Firms in jurisdictions with state commissions and those in states with commissions setting the rate
base on an original cost basis have higher unit costs. Unit costs
In [14J.
SS as developed in Section 4 is not used simultaneously with REG and
FAIR because they are designed to measure the same dimensions of regulatory
policy.

5. Results

1.;
16
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in states with commissions are, on average, seven percent
higher.
Signs of other coefficients are consistent with a priori expectations. Fuel, labor, and capital price coefficients are all positive
and significant. Newer vintage plants have significantly lower
costs. The coefficients of the quantity variables imply that average costs decrease with quantity out to a minimum of 4447
million KWH. Only seven plants in the sample exceeded that
level of production.

Regression A

=

-0.1717 + 0.0880NH - 0.1008LQ' + 0.0590LQ'LQ'
(3.85)
(-8.11)
(8.42)
+ 0.6237LF'+ 0.1784LL' + 0.2680LK' - 0.0189TC - 0.0006Y
(15.26)
(2.75)
(2.18)
(-4.45)
(-0.06)
+ 0.0701REG + 0.0013FAIR
(3.04)
(0.08)

LCaST'

Number of observations: 168
R2 = 0.82.
Regression B uses the generalized cost function, but without
the interaction terms of SS with LQ, LF, LL, and LK. The joint
hypothesis that the coefficients of these terms are all zero cannot be rejected. The computed F-statistic is 0.759. The critical
value at 0.05 is 2.45. The hypothesis that the appropriate functional form (when using SS) is a modified Cobb-Douglas, suoh
as was used in Regression A, is, however, rejected.
The effect of changes in SS on the log of costs is given by:
dIne'
dSS'

=

-3.627 - 550.2(SS').

(48)

Equation (48) has a maximum at SS = -0.0066. In accordance with the requirements of Section 3, SS was normalized to
have a mean equal to zero. In terms of the original data, the
maximum occurs at SS' = 0.005. Less than fifteen percent of
the observations on SS do not exceed that maximum point. The
result suggests that the cost inflating effects of regulation can be
reduced if the firm is regulated very tightly, but such an interpretation undoubtedly gives greater credit to the data and estimation procedures than their precision would justify. The estimates
do suggest, however, that as regulation tightens, costs
increase-although evidently at a decreasing rate.
For the other estimated coefficients of Regression B, all
linear terms in input prices are positive and significant. Technology results in a decrease in costs, and the unit cost curve
decreases to a minimum at 7358 million KWH. This level is
greater than for all but three of the output observations.

Regression B
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LCaST' = -0.0185 -0.1160LQ' +0.0409LQ'LQ' -0.0127TC
(-7.81)
(4.19)
(-3.20)

-0.OO20Y +0.5299LF' +0.3260LL' + 0.4088LK' -4.763LK'LK'
(-0.23)
(9.15)
(4.79)
(2.44)
(- 3 .29)
+ 0.8516LF'LF' + 0.6055LL'LL' + 1.704LF'LK' -1.277LF'LL'
(4.04)
(1.36)
(2.76)
(-4.69)
+0.0846LF'LQ' -5.874LK'LL' +O.4lO2LK'LQ' +0.1943LL'LQ'
(1.06)
(-5.88)
(2.00)
(1.90)
- 3.625SS'
(-3.73)

- 275.1SS'SS'
( -4.93)
Number of observations: 141
R2=0.87.

Turning to the percent of cost paid to capital, the basic
estimating equation is (39). In actual practice, the Y and TC
variables are included to allow for year-to-year and technology
effects, and the NH variable to adjust for differences attributable to holding companies.
Using REG and FAIR, it is found that their coefficients are
both positive and that of REG is significant at 0.01. Tighter
regulation is associated with a greater proportion of cost going
to capital. Looking at the other coefficients, both the linear and
quadratic terms in quantity are significant. They suggest that
there are savings on the use of capital in comparison to other
inputs up to some point. The coefficient of the fuel price is
negative and significant. The cost of fuel makes up a large
component of total costs as found in the denominator of PC.
The coefficient of the wage rate is positive and significant. This
might be explained by substitution of capital for labor as wages
increase, however previous studies such as that by Dhrymes
and Kurz 17 found little substitution between labor and capital.
The capital price coefficient is negative but not significant. A
possible explanation is that high rental rates on capital increase
the cost of using a given amount of capital, but this is offset by
substitution of other inputs (primarily fuel) as capital becomes
more expensive. An interesting conclusion is that newer technology in a plant seems to have no effect on the share of cost
going to capital. This suggests that technology has been neutral
among inputs or at least for capital as compared to labor and
fuel considered together.
Regression C
PC

=

-0.0502 - 0.0114LQ' + 0.0132LQ'LQ' - 0.1510LF'
(-2.40)
(4.89)
(-9.63)
+ 0.0675LL'- 0.0037LK' - .OO03TC - .0083Y
(2.71)
(-0.29)
(-0.20)
(-2.30)
+ 0.0223NH + .0267REG + .0026FAIR
(2.53)
(3.02)
(0.38)
Number of observations: 168
R2 = 0.49.

When the continuous variable SS is used to determine the
effect of regulation on the proportion paid to capital, the findings
TEST OF
17

In [7).
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are similar to those of Regression C. The signs of the quantity
and input price variables are the same. Their magnitudes and
t-statistics change quantitatively, but the comments made for
Regression C still hold. SS is negative and significant at 0.01. As
regulation becomes more stringent, the firm spends a greater
fraction of total cost on capital.
Regression D
-0.0036 - 0.0095LQ' + 0.0132LQ'LQ' - 0.1878LF'
(-1.80)
(4.62)
(-9.09)
+ 0.1023LL' - 0.0253LK' + 0.0013TC - 0.0090Y - 1.336SS'
(3.53)
(-0.41)
(0.70)
(-2.20)
(-2.96)

PC

=

Number of observations: 141
R2 = 0.50 .

6. Summary and
conclusion

124 I H. CRAIG PETERSEN

• The Averch-lohnson model provides analytical support for
the proposition that rate of return regulation may result in
inefficient production. In this paper the A-l model is reformulated in terms of cost-minimization subject to the regulatory
constraint. It is shown that as regulation tightens, that is, as the
allowed return approaches the cost of capital, the firm has
higher unit costs and spends a larger portion of total cost on
capital. These two relationships are testable hypotheses of the
revised A-l model.
A general functional form is adopted for empirical analysis.
This form does not put a priori restrictions on the coefficients of
the cost function. The sample consists of steam generating
plants which experience a large addition to capacity just prior to
the sample period, 1966 to 1968. Three measures of regulatory
policy with regard to the allowed return are used. The first is the
dichotomy between firms operating in states with state commissions and those without. The second is the separation of original
cost from fair value rate base jurisdictions. It is assumed that
regulation is more strict in states with state commissions and in
original cost jurisdictions. The third measure is an attempt to
measure the actual difference between the allowed return and
the cost of capital.
The evidence supports the hypotheses. Using both a
modified Cobb- Douglas and the more general form of the cost
function, it is found that as regulation tightens, unit costs increase. The result is statistically significant using the state commission versus no state commission dichotomy and also using
the continuous measure of the allowed return minus the cdst of
capital. It is also found that the percent of cost going to capital
increases with more stringent regulation. This result is also
statistically significant when the same two measures are used.
In summary, the findings of this analysis are that the empirical evidence does support the Averch-lohnson contention. The
conclusions here are also generally consistent with those previously reported by Spann and by Courville. Additional results on

this topic and on other effects of regulation are presented in an
earlier work of the author. 18

Appendix

• The following notation is used in reporting the results of the
econometric analysis:

LcaST
PC
Y

TC

LQ
LL
LK
LF
REG

FAIR
SS

NH
LQLQ
LQLL
LQLF
LQLK

Log of unit cost of production.
Percent of total unit cost going to capital.
Year of observation.
Index of technological change.
Log of quantity produced.
Log of annual wage rate.
Log of capital rental rate.
Log of fuel price.
Dummy variable. Value equals one for firms under
staie commission.
Dummy variable. Value equals one for firms regulated on an original cost basis.
Allowed return on equity minus the cost of equity
capital adjusted for capitalization differences.
Dummy variable. Value equals one if firm is part of a
holding company.
Log of quantity times log of quantity.
Log of quantity times log of wage rate.
Log of quantity times log of fuel price.
Log of quantity times log of capital rental rate.

In general, products of two variables required by equation
(38) are denoted by LiLj where Li and Lj are the respective
variable names. The last four entrys in the column above are
examples.
Standard tests of statistical significance are used. In most
cases a coefficient will be considered significantly different from
zero if it passes a two-tailed (-test at an alpha level of 0.05. If the
sign of the coefficient is given by the theoretical model or a
priori expectation, then a one-tail test at 0.05 will be the criteria.
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